This meeting of the Senate Foreign Relations

Committee will be called to order.

The Foreign Relations Committee meets today to continue our

examination of the crisis in Sudan. Our committee has been deeply

interested in this issue. On July 22, 2004, Congress passed Senate

Con. Res. 133, which declared the policies of the government of

Sudan in the Darfur region to be genocide. A year ago this month,

we invited former Secretary of State Colin Powell to testify before

our committee on Sudan. At that hearing, he voiced the U.S. Government’s

conclusion that genocide was indeed occurring. Then in

December, Congress passed the Comprehensive Peace in Sudan Act

of 2004, which I introduced with Senator Biden.

Our hope has been that the United States would maintain a

strong leadership role in organizing and implementing the international

response to the crisis in Sudan. In fact, the United States

has provided diplomatic, economic, military, and humanitarian assistance

that has mitigated the genocide, but not eliminated it.

Compared with a year ago, casualty rates in Darfur have fallen significantly

and humanitarian assistance is reaching displaced persons

with greater consistency. In addition, largely through the

work of former Presidential Envoy to Sudan and United States Ambassador,

John Danforth, the United States helped broker the

Comprehensive Peace Agreement between the north and the south,

signed January 9, 2005.

But despite this progress, millions of Sudanese still suffer in precarious

circumstances, threatened by violence, hunger, and disease.

Moreover, some U.S. diplomatic and economic initiatives to influence

the actions of the Government of Sudan on Darfur continue

to be stymied by countries pursuing economic or political advantage.

The Darfur crisis is complex, but it has not been sudden. It has

gradually unfolded, providing ample opportunity for humanitarian

action by the international community. Although many nations

have responded, the resolve and unity of the international community

have not been commensurate to the horrors of the crisis.

Khartoum’s status as an oil exporter, a major arms importer, and

an Islamic government has diminished the appetite for decisive action

in some foreign capitals. But neither economic interests, nor

religious identification should trump responsible international actions

in a case where genocidal policies are being conducted.

Today’s hearing on Sudan is an opportunity to explore ways the

United States can continue to lead the humanitarian and diplomatic

response to the genocide in Darfur. An important part of an

effective response is the consolidation of the Comprehensive Peace

Agreement that was concluded with significant U.S. leadership.

That agreement was intended to have a moderating influence on

the Sudanese government and its policies in Darfur. Thus far,

there is little evidence of that.

The African Union has taken gradual but useful steps as a regional

organization in responding to the crisis in Sudan, as well as

elsewhere on the continent. With transportation help from NATO,

the African Union force in Sudan is expected to reach 7,700 troops

by the end of October. The African Union, however, has capacity

and capability limitations. If it is to succeed fully, it must continue

to integrate international planning, logistics, and technical assistance

into its operations.

Today we look forward to learning the estimates of our witnesses

about the effectiveness of the current mandate for the African

Union and the prospects for an expansion of that mandate. We also

expect to hear what further role the United Nations and NATO can

play in assisting in Darfur security. It is clear that the civilian population

and humanitarian groups must be better protected from attacks

by militias and rebels.

I am encouraged by the stability following the recent tragic death

of the First Vice President, Dr. John Garang, in a helicopter crash.

An international investigation will report on the causes of that

crash, but preliminary reports indicate that it probably was an accident.

Dr. Garang was instrumental in concluding the peace agreement,

and his successors must sustain his decades-long commitment

to Sudan by building a durable peace that brings economic

development.

We are pleased today to be joined by two good friends of the committee,

who speak with knowledge and authority about United

States efforts in Sudan. First we will hear from Deputy Secretary

of State Robert Zoellick. He will discuss the overarching United

States approach to peace and stability across Sudan.

The administration has stated unequivocally that a resolution in

Darfur is essential if there is to be an improvement in relations

with the Sudanese government. I am encouraged by Secretary

Zoellick’s personal engagement in Sudan and his naming of a special

representative, Roger Winter, to help resolve the crisis in

Darfur. Even as we focus on Darfur, we must be cognizant that

simmering disputes in the East and the South remain a threat to

the Comprehensive Peace Agreement.

On our second panel, we will hear from General James Jones,

Supreme Allied Commander Europe. Under General Jones’ leadership,

EUCOM has established constructive ties with numerous African

militaries and begun a process of improving regional cooperation.

The North Atlantic Council tasked General Jones with supporting

the efforts of the African Union in Sudan. He has skillfully

applied NATO’s airlift capacity and other technical assistance to

the endeavor, and has worked with other international partners to

ensure the delivery of security resources to the region. We are interested

in the lessons learned through this mission, but also the

opportunities that such assistance gives for mutually reinforcing

the common goal of peace and stability. We are also eager to hear

about EUCOM’s role in building cooperative security in the region,

such as in Chad.

I thank our distinguished witnesses for coming this morning. We

look forward to an insightful discussion on Sudan and Darfur.

As Senator Biden arrives and has an opportunity to look at his

notes, I will recognize him for an opening statement. But at this

time, I would like to call upon our first witness, the Honorable Robert

Zoellick.

We appreciate very much your coming this morning. I understand

that you have extensive testimony. And the committee will

not have a time limit. We want to hear from you, and we appreciate

your testimony. Please proceed.

So, I do not want to draw too much from all of

that. But the Chair wrestled with these problems and we have two

panels.

Secretary Zoellick, you have asked for congressional support and

resources. Can you give any more specific an idea of what would

be desirable? You have given a very comprehensive briefing. It is

dazzlingly complex. As you pointed out, moving circles intersect,

and the dynamics are really uncertain. To say the least, this is

very difficult for many of us on this committee, quite apart from

our colleagues who do not have the opportunity to study this in the

same way, to understand what the role of the United States ought

to be beyond what you are doing diplomatically, in terms of money,

appropriations or programs or of congressional participation.

Can you address this more specifically?

Does that give complete room for all the activities

that are going on? There is no conflict currently that I know

of within the Security Council. Is that right?

Is there peace with the neighbors of Sudan? Are

there any difficulties with any of the neighbors fomenting trouble

or taking advantage of the situation?

Thank you very much, Senator Feingold.

I just have one short question, Mr. Secretary. The new State Department

Office for Stabilization and Reconstruction headed by

former Ambassador Carlos Pascual is in Sudan presently. This is

their first operation. Can you describe how and where they are engaged

and how they are doing?

Well, thank you very much. We appreciate that

you and Secretary Rice have been working to perfect this. This new

team is going to need a great deal of assistance, both through identification

of their mission and likewise the budget for the mission.

I am sure you understand.

We will once again have an eight-minute question

period for each one of us.

Let me start, General Jones, by saying that your own leadership

in the African mission has been really extraordinary. And I ask

from that context, on behalf of many of us, for you to discuss how

NATO became involved in Africa at all. Concerning the context of

our discussion with Darfur, we are pleased that you are involved.

The same question, I suppose, could have been raised, and has

been at various NATO conferences, as to why NATO has taken an

interest in the Middle East, or taken a look at the Mediterranean

associations in which NATO has been involved.

You have mentioned these wide relationships with the United

Nations as a whole, but also obviously with the EU, with the African

Union. Describe the evolution of how the NATO mission, the

trans-Atlantic alliance and the mutual defense that was implied by

that almost half a century ago, has moved to Africa, quite apart

from other situations.

Well, that is a very important explanation, in

terms of both the geographical compactness now realized and Europe’s

own situation with regard to many persons who have come

from the northern African states and who are resident now in Europe,

with sometimes the potential for terrorism and the actuality

of it in some unfortunate instances. It does show the evolution of

static conflict in Europe with respect to the war on terrorism or the

problems of international drugs or other things that plague people.

And you have shown the tie-ins with the states of our country,

which is interesting, because there were many such pairings in Europe.

But now, as NATO’s focus and Europe’s come together, this

type of confluence of interest is apparent.

One thing you touched upon that is important, I think, is to understand

the tremendous search by China for petrochemicals, and

oil in particular, in Africa, and how this affects the geopolitics. We

may be unfair in our criticism of the Chinese, but at least we have

observed that they are not fastidious with regard to the democratic

elements. Wherever there is oil, there are apparently deals to be

made, to bid for the last acre.

And the Chinese are not alone in that. They are sometimes accompanied

by people from India, for example, which is confusing to

us. As we saw just in the last few days, gas pipelines suggested

from India to Iran, at the very time that we are involved in delicate

negotiations with European friends with regard to nuclear weapons

in Iran.

Can you comment on this particular problem? It touches upon

Sudan, and it touches upon Algeria, as well as other countries that

have resources of this kind. Is this pervasive search for oil, maybe

even this desperate search, likely due to the geopolitics that are involved?

And how does that affect your mission?